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FUTILITY OF EXHAUSTION: WHY BRADY CLAIMS SHOULD
TRUMP FEDERAL EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS
Tiffany R. Murphy*
A defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights are violated when a state
agency fails to disclose crucial exculpatory or impeachment evidence—so-called
Brady violations. When this happens, the defendant should be provided the means
not only to locate this evidence, but also to fully develop it in state post-conviction
processes. When the state system prohibits both the means and legal mechanism to
develop Brady claims, the defendant should be immune to any procedural penalties
in either state or federal court. In other words, the defendant should not be required
to return to state court to exhaust such a claim. Instead, once the federal court
finds a viable claim, the court should be allowed to review the claim on the merits
and grant relief. Because these claims arise from the failure of state actors to per-
form their duties properly, the federal courts should forfeit their right to demand
adherence to the federal exhaustion requirement. Requiring a defendant to return
to state court for exhaustion penalizes the defendant unjustly for a constitutional
violation created solely by the state.
INTRODUCTION
John Tennison lost over thirteen years of his life in prison for a
crime he did not commit. The police and prosecution knew their
case contained serious flaws. The case rested on two supposed eye-
witnesses who were eleven and fourteen years old.1 Despite this, the
prosecution moved forward with the case and successfully convicted
Tennison and his co-defendant, Antoine Goff, of first-degree mur-
der.2 At the age of seventeen, Tennison faced spending most of his
life in prison. After exhausting his state direct and post-conviction
appeals, Tennison sought review in federal habeas corpus.3 It was
during this appeal that he obtained discovery illustrating numerous
counts of police and prosecutorial misconduct resulting in viola-
tions of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.4
* Clinical Professor and Director of the Oklahoma Innocence Project at Oklahoma
City University School of Law; J.D. University of Michigan Law School; B.A. University of
Michigan; The author would like to thank Arthur LeFrancois, Danne Johnson, Jennifer
Prilliman, David Moran, Randy Bauman, Andrea Miller, and Craig Cooley for their insight
and support.
1. Tennison v. Henry, No. 98-3842 CW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27886, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 26, 2003).
2. Tennison v. Henry, 203 F.R.D. 435, 437 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
3. Tennison, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27886, at *7–8.
4. See Tennison, 203 F.R.D. 435.
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He also found out that the exculpatory and impeachment evidence
establishing his innocence, as well as the identity of the true perpe-
trator, was impermissibly withheld from his trial attorneys.
The discovery of a failure to disclose exculpatory or impeach-
ment evidence, also known as a Brady violation, results in forty-two
percent of the exonerations in this country.5 However, because of
state court rules governing the criminal appellate process, uncover-
ing exculpatory or impeachment evidence usually does not occur
until the prisoner has started state post-conviction proceedings.6
Moreover, because state court judges are loath to grant post-convic-
tion discovery, many Brady violations are not uncovered until the
state prisoner pursues federal habeas relief in federal court.7
Tennison suffered this fate. He was diligent in his pleadings and
in requesting additional evidence to prove his innocence,8 but the
state continually withheld evidence that would have revealed the
actual perpetrator and proved Tennison’s innocence.9 The police
took a statement from the shooter but failed to disclose it until well
after the defense could utilize the information during the state pro-
ceedings.10 The state court denied Tennison’s motion for new trial,
direct appeal, and state post-conviction,11 and the state appellate
courts affirmed his convictions.12 Federal habeas corpus provided
Tennison with the only avenue of discovery that could allow him to
establish both his Brady claim and his police and prosecutorial mis-
conduct claims.13 Yet, because his new Brady and misconduct claims
were unexhausted, as he had been unable to bring them in state
court, Tennison was required to stay his federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in order to present the California state courts the
opportunity to grant him relief.14 The state court summarily denied
5. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL
SHAFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY
OF EXONERATIONS 67 (2012).
6. See generally Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388 (2011) (highlighting that state courts are the proper forum to fully develop and
litigate constitutional claims); see also Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather
than the Result, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 85, 113 (2012) (explaining the Supreme Court’s em-
phasis on developing Brady claims in state court).
7. See generally BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011).
8. Tennison, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27886, at *108–09, *139–40.
9. Id. at *108–09.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *7–9.
12. Id. at *7.
13. See id. at *6–9 (following the Court’s discovery order, defense counsel found, for
example, that a woman had contacted the police prior to the trial and told them that she
knew that someone else had committed the murder)
14. Id. at *9.
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his appeals without permitting any discovery.15 Only upon re-
turning to federal court did Tennison obtain the relief to which he
was entitled.16
When state prisoners uncover meritorious Brady evidence in fed-
eral habeas proceedings, they can generally overcome the
procedural barriers preventing substantive review of their constitu-
tional claims.17 However, due to federalism concerns and the
Supreme Court’s byzantine habeas jurisprudence, state prisoners
normally must return to state court to give the state courts the first
opportunity to consider the prisoner’s new facts and adjudicate his
Brady claims.18 In other words, the state prisoner must “exhaust”19
his Brady claims before the very state courts that initially denied his
post-conviction discovery request and affirmed his conviction.
This Article’s primary objective is to explain why the futility doc-
trine20 should recognize an exception to the exhaustion rule where
a state prisoner diligently pursued, but was arbitrarily denied, dis-
covery in state court and nevertheless obtained discovery in federal
habeas proceedings that revealed the very Brady violations the pris-
oner alleged during his initial state post-conviction proceedings. In
these situations, the federal habeas court should have the authority
to substantively review the prisoner’s constitutional claims without
forcing the state prisoner to return to state court so he may “fairly
present”21 his new facts and claims to the state courts. Requiring
exhaustion rewards the prosecution for withholding material evi-
dence prior to trial, during state post-conviction, and during
federal habeas proceedings.22 Likewise, it rewards the state courts
15. Id. at *10.
16. Id. at *139–40.
17. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263
(1999); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
18. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) (“[T]he state courts should have
the first opportunity to review [a defendant’s federal] claim[s] and provide any necessary
relief.”).
19. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
20. The futility doctrine allows certain claims to bypass the exhaustion requirement if
the defendant is able to demonstrate that returning to state court for exhaustion is not possi-
ble or would not result in substantive review of the claim.
21. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 523 (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)); see
also Rhine v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2005) (explaining the necessity of exhaustion of
all claims in state direct appeal or collateral proceedings before a federal court may review
the merits of these claims).
22. There is often little to no discipline for improper actions by prosecutors on either a
state or federal level. See generally Jordan Smith, Panel Emphasizes Need for Prosecutorial Oversight,
AUSTIN CHRON., Apr. 6, 2012, available at http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2012-04-
06/panel-emphasizes-need-for-prosecutorial-oversight/. Prosecutors with repeated Brady or
Napue violations cannot face civil suit due to their absolute immunity. See generally Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). Most state bar
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for failing to provide the fundamentally adequate23 processes neces-
sary to expose the Brady violations that the state courts initially
concluded did not exist. The obstacles facing defendants asserting
such claims are made even more complicated by the Supreme
Court’s recent holding in Cullen v. Pinholster24 limiting federal
habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the state court record
on both direct appeal and state post-conviction or similar collateral
proceedings, which occur after direct appeal.
This Article seeks to show the problems plaguing defendants who
have potentially meritorious claims of prosecutorial misconduct
when the state fails to divulge key evidence and the state judicial
system provides little means for the factual development of these
claims. Part I of this Article details the evolution of Brady claims and
their treatment in direct appeal, state post-conviction, and federal
habeas corpus proceedings. Part II discusses the various state court
avenues available to defendants to locate Brady materials, including
the current limitations of these systems. Part III advocates for and
explains why Brady violations should be excused from exhaustion
requirements. This Part also remarks on Brady claims’ unsettled
treatment in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cullen v. Pinhol-
ster and several other cases currently before the Court.
I. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR: PROTECTING DUE PROCESS
The prosecutor’s obligation is first and foremost to seek justice.
The Supreme Court explains that prosecutors must “prosecute with
earnestness,” but must know that their duty is equally  “to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic-
tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.”25 The understanding that “it is better that ten guilty persons
escape than that one innocent suffer[s]” often gets lost in the day-
to-day evaluation of criminal cases.26 Due to the significant amount
of power prosecutors have to arrest, charge, and incarcerate the
associations do little to dissuade known abuses by prosecutors. See infra note 133. The lack of
any official oversight gives prosecutors a free pass for due process violations with little to no
incentive to improve the quality of their practice.
23. See Marceau, supra note 6, at 140; see also Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (explaining that federal courts may only overturn
state holdings if the state appellate process is “fundamentally inadequate”).
24. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
25. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
26. See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *358).
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accused, the Supreme Court provided them with guidelines to en-
sure that defendants receive a fair trial. Specifically, prosecutors
have two primary responsibilities: one involves the disclosure of evi-
dence pre-trial, and the other involves ensuring the truthfulness of
trial testimony. Part A discusses the scope of a Brady violation, while
Part B delves into a prosecutor’s obligations before the court. Fi-
nally, Parts C and D explain how Brady claims are treated in state
post-conviction and federal habeas corpus, respectively.
A. Defining Brady Violations
Brady violations occur when a prosecutor fails to disclose, prior to
trial, exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to the ac-
cused.27 Finding such evidence is the duty of the prosecutor since
he is responsible for “any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the po-
lice.”28 Therefore, he must monitor any state or federal agencies
that are involved in the investigation, the evaluation of evidence,
and any other aspects of the state’s case. Whether the prosecutor
had knowledge of the withheld evidence is irrelevant when consid-
ering if a Brady violation occurred and its impact on a defendant.29
Qualifying evidence comes in many forms, including a confidential
informant’s prior criminal history, an eyewitness’s identification of
another person, or a plea deal with a key state witness that was
never disclosed.30
The Supreme Court first recognized this claim in Brady v. Mary-
land, where the Court overturned the penalty phase conviction
27. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
447 (1976) (noting that a prosecutor is obligated to disclose evidence or mitigation).
28. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); see also A Call For Congress to Reform Federal
Criminal Discovery, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, Mar. 8, 2012 (requesting Congress to revise
the federal discovery provisions to give prosecutors more guidance of what must be disclosed
to defendants pretrial to ensure Brady v. Maryland and its progeny are followed); William M.
Welch II & William W. Taylor III, The Brady Problem: Time to Face Reality, NAT’L L.J. & LEGAL
TIMES, July 16, 2012, at 44 (explaining the need to expand the federal disclosure require-
ment under Brady v. Maryland in light of the former Senator Ted Stevens’s wrongful
conviction based on police and prosecutorial misconduct: “At a minimum, the rule must
require prosecutors to disclose all interviews of witnesses, whether they are to be called or
not, and all grand jury testimony, well in advance of trial.”).
29. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (holding that the good or bad faith
of the prosecutor is irrelevant in determining the prejudice incurred to the defendant).
30. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (involving a situation where the State
paid a key witness in their case against Banks); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)
(involving a situation where the State dismissed a witness’ charges in exchange for his testi-
mony without disclosing it to the defense).
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based upon the prosecution’s failure to turn over evidence mitigat-
ing Brady’s involvement in a murder.31 The Court later expanded
the scope of the Brady doctrine to mandate the disclosure of any
deals or benefits given to prosecution witnesses for their testimony
against the defendant,32 including any benefits received by the wit-
ness, payments made by the witness, or the state dropping a witness’
criminal charges.33 Additionally, the Court held that the prosecu-
tion may not withhold other kinds of impeachment evidence that
would aid in a thorough cross-examination.34
Asserting a meritorious claim under Brady and its progeny re-
quires the defendant to make the following showing: “[t]he
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued.”35 Prejudice occurs when a defendant
demonstrates a reasonable probability of a different result based
upon a cumulative assessment of the undisclosed evidence along
with what was presented at trial.36 Most claims fail on the prejudice,
or materiality, prong because the defendant is unable to demon-
strate that the decision to withhold evidence caused actual harm
leading to the conviction.37 Additionally, specificity is required to
establish actual prejudice, which is extremely difficult since most
claims are raised with only partial evidence of a violation.38 When
the withheld evidence is provided, courts weigh the evidence in
light of what the state presented at trial to determine whether with-
holding the evidence was in fact prejudicial to the defendant.39
The Brady doctrine focuses on the harm suffered by the defen-
dant when deprived of evidence that is vital to his defense.40 The
failure to disclose such evidence deprives a defendant of his Four-
teenth Amendment due process rights to a fair trial because it
impairs defense counsel’s ability to properly prepare and challenge
the state’s case.41 Specifically, the defendant is limited in his ability
31. Brady, 373 U.S. at 89–90 (1963).
32. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154–55.
33. Id.; see also Banks, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
34. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).
35. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
36. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–90.
37. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
38. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 692 (showing how Banks’ counsel had limited evidence of
deals with witnesses without finding state documents showing violation).
39. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–14 (1976); see also Banks, 540 U.S. at 700.
40. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674–76.
41. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675–76.
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to present evidence that may render charges against him meaning-
less, to hire experts to challenge an aspect of the prosecution’s case,
or to find witnesses who refute the state’s allegations.
The Tenth Circuit’s reversal of Yancy Douglas and Paris Powell’s
convictions demonstrates how Brady claims often come about
through random luck.42 That court found that the Assistant District
Attorney improperly withheld an arrangement between himself and
Derrick Smith, the sole eyewitness to the shooting the defendants
were convicted of, concerning his numerous prison sentences,
which were reduced in return for his cooperation during the tri-
als.43 The drive-by shooting death of Shauna Farrow left the
surviving witness, Derrick Smith, to identify those he saw flee the
scene in a grey Datsun.44 After numerous inconsistent statements,
Smith told Oklahoma City Police Detectives that Yancy Douglas and
Paris Powell were the shooters. Both were charged and convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death based primarily on
Smith’s testimony.45 Assistant District Attorney Brad Miller asked
Smith on direct examination if Smith benefited from his testimony.
Smith denied receiving any benefits. Further, Miller’s closing argu-
ment emphasized the lack of any deals.46
After Douglas and Powell’s direct appeals and state post-convic-
tion efforts were denied, they sought relief through federal habeas
corpus.47 After the denial of Douglas’ initial habeas petition, but
while Powell’s case was still pending before the federal court, Smith
recanted his testimony, “asserting that he had received Miller’s as-
sistance in exchange for his testimony, contrary to his denials at
both trials.”48 According to Smith’s affidavit, Miller went to great
lengths to protect his informant while also preserving the convic-
tions of both defendants. Smith received early parole for his
testimony and continued to benefit from Miller’s protection even
after being charged and convicted of additional crimes in Texas
and Oklahoma.49 Miller contacted prosecutors in both states after
42. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1167 (2009) (discussing that Smith, the prose-
cution’s star witness, wrote a handwritten affidavit recanting his identification of Powell and
Douglas).
43. Id. at 1187.
44. See id. at 1161.
45. Id. at 1163–64.
46. Id. The prosecutor’s actions also constituted a violation of due process under Napue
v. Illinois. Id.; see also supra note 62.
47. Id. at 1166–67.
48. Id. at 1167.
49. See id.
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he left the district attorney’s office and assisted Smith in obtaining
minimal jail time or quicker parole.50
Upon learning of Smith’s confession, Douglas and Powell re-
quested the right to amend their habeas petitions based upon this
newly discovered evidence. Douglas was allowed to file a successive
petition, while Powell was able to include the claim in his initial
petition, as his habeas case was filed after Douglas’s.51 However,
both defendants were required to exhaust their newly discovered
Brady claims in state court before the federal courts could substan-
tively evaluate their claims.52 In both cases, the Oklahoma courts
denied the successive state petitions on procedural grounds without
allowing any further factual development or permitting an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the viability of the constitutional claims
with regard to the newly discovered evidence.53 Only after returning
to federal court did Douglas and Powell receive full discovery of the
prosecution’s file, which substantiated their prosecutorial miscon-
duct claims. Additionally, the district court granted an evidentiary
hearing where Smith, Miller, and other witnesses testified, establish-
ing more misconduct than originally alleged by either defendant.54
The Tenth Circuit found that Miller’s actions in failing to divulge
the extent of the agreement amounted to a fraud on the Court:
[T]he prosecutor’s misconduct in Mr. Douglas’s case was not
merely inadvertent, but was instead willful and intentional. . . .
The prosecutor’s conduct at issue here, then, is akin to a
fraud on the federal habeas courts; that is, the prosecutor took
affirmative actions to conceal his tacit agreement with the
state’s key witness until it was too late, procedurally, for Mr.
50. Id.
51. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(c), Douglas must request and receive permission
from the court of appeals to file a successor federal habeas corpus petition.
52. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1168 (2009); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.
269 (2005) (allowing for federal habeas petitioners to stay their federal habeas corpus litiga-
tion while they return to state courts to exhaust their claims).
53. Workman, 560 F.3d at 1168; see also Douglas v. State, 953 P.2d 349 (1998); Powell v.
State, 995 P.2d 510 (2000). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that the proce-
dural bar the state courts used was not adequate and independent, the standard for
maintaining deference to state court rulings, thereby allowing the appeals court to review the
claim on the merits without any deference to the state court’s ruling. Workman, 560 F.3d at
1172.
54. Id. at 1168 (allowing both petitioners to review the entire Oklahoma County District
Attorney’s file on both cases). Complicating matters further is the shift in federal habeas
corpus review, which now mandates that all such evidence be fully developed and litigated in
state court before a federal court will substantively review the claim. A defendant must ex-
haust his constitutional claim along with the underlying facts supporting it in state court
prior to any federal court substantive review. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257–58 (1986);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
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Douglas to use that undisclosed agreement successfully to
challenge his capital conviction.55
On those grounds, the Court granted both Powell and Douglas a
writ of habeas corpus, which overturned their capital convictions.56
Cases similar to those of Douglas, Powell, and Tennison occur fre-
quently, but unfortunately often are unsuccessful because
defendants are unable to navigate the state and federal criminal
appellate processes.
However, since Douglas and Powell were capital defendants,
their counsel was able to investigate their constitutional claims and
help them navigate through the mire of state post-conviction and
federal habeas corpus proceedings.57 As the courts consistently ex-
plain how “death is different,” the requirements of counsel
throughout the process ensures some protections not available to
those sentenced to Life Without the Possibility of Parole or a term
of years.58 Even with such competent counsel, however, mandatory
exhaustion in state court resulted in delayed justice for both men.
The Oklahoma state courts failed to provide any substantive review
and instead imposed procedural defaults59 that had to be dealt with
in federal court.60 Had they received a non-capital sentence, there
is a strong likelihood that these due process violations would never
have come to light or been remedied, and that both men would still
be incarcerated.61
55. Workman, 560 F.3d at 1192–93.
56. Id. at 1196.
57. The Court requires counsel throughout criminal appellate proceedings for capital
cases. The Supreme Court considers capital cases under a heightened level of scrutiny, often
described as “death is different.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991); see also
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (holding that abandonment of a capital defendant
allows cause and prejudice to be met for ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
58. Id.
59. Procedural defaults occur when a constitutional claim fails to comply with a state
procedural requirement. Here, the procedural default prevented the federal court from re-
viewing the claim on the merits.
60. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied Douglas’s successive state post-
conviction application on procedural grounds that the appeal was not timely filed in accor-
dance with Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 9.7(G)(3). Workman, 560 F.3d at 1171.
This procedural bar prevented the state court from reaching the merits of Douglas’s claim
and would prevent a federal court from substantively reviewing the claim absent a finding of
cause and prejudice or actual innocence. See generally Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986);
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
61. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1082 (2011) (stating that counsel is appointed in non-capi-
tal cases only at the discretion of the court).
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B. Napue Violations
In addition to his pre-trial duties, a prosecutor is responsible for
preventing any known false testimony from reaching the trier of
fact, whether it is the judge or jury.62   This requirement was estab-
lished in Napue v. Illinois, where the prosecutor failed to correct a
witness who lied about a plea deal he received for his trial testi-
mony; this was found to be improper.63 Similar to Brady, the
underlying goal of this requirement of prosecutors is to ensure a
fair trial through the reliability of the evidence presented.64  In nu-
merous Brady cases, prosecutors are often found to have committed
Napue violations, and the Court’s analysis of both constitutional vio-
lations is intertwined.65  As the Court said, “A lie is a lie, no matter
what its subject, and if it is in any way relevant to the case, the dis-
trict attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he
knows to be false and elicit the truth.”66
The harm associated with a Napue violation is not limited to a
specific defendant, but instead undermines the credibility of the
criminal justice system as a whole. Fairness remains a bedrock prin-
ciple of the criminal justice system, requiring ethical behavior as
prosecutors pursue their cases:
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction
through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a
means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to pro-
cure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.67
62. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (overturning the conviction based upon the
prosecutor’s unconstitutional actions resulting in a Fourteenth Amendment due process
violation).
63. Id.; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (holding that it is fundamentally unfair to use
perjured testimony to obtain a conviction).
64. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (discussing how the third element of Brady—
materiality—is satisfied).
65. See id. at 441–44; Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 668 (2004).
66. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269–70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557 (1956)).
67. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 86 (1963) (including the prosecution’s failure to correct knowingly false testimony as a
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation).
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Even if the failure to correct is inadvertent, the end result is the
same: a due process violation depriving the defendant of a fair
trial.68
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The three levels of review for felony convictions—direct appeal,
state post-conviction, and federal habeas corpus—allow state pris-
oners to challenge their convictions in both state and federal court.
Substantive claims raised in each appeal vary considerably depend-
ing on the state criminal code. In many states, direct appeal is
limited to the four corners of the trial record, which means that
only the errors appearing in the transcript may be raised.69 Because
of the complexity of both state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus, the failure to properly raise the legal basis along with all
supporting facts can result in both systems dismissing the case on
procedural grounds.   Similar to Brady claims, constitutional claims
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, eyewitness identifica-
tion, forensic science challenges, and police and prosecutorial
misconduct requiring evidence beyond the trial transcript must be
raised in state post-conviction where the defendant does not have
68. See also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38; Banks, 540 U.S. at 691 (discussing where the prose-
cution failed to correcting knowingly false evidence and also violated Brady in not disclosing
exculpatory evidence).
69. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317–18 (2012) (discussing the difficulty in
presenting a thoroughly investigated and pled ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state
post-conviction without the aid of counsel).
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the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.70 Therefore, state prison-
ers often are expected to develop and litigate all relevant
constitutional claims without counsel or investigators.71 State post-
conviction courts consider any claims not properly asserted in the
initial petition to be waived,72 meaning state inmates must assert
such claims with minimal legal assistance.
The Supreme Court has made clear that constitutional claims ex-
ceeding the scope of the trial record, such as some ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, must be brought at the first available
opportunity, i.e. either on direct appeal or state post-conviction
proceedings.73 Recently, the Supreme Court, in Martinez v. Ryan, re-
emphasized the importance of state collateral proceedings for re-
viewing bedrock constitutional claims.74 For those constitutional
claims requiring investigation or factual development beyond the
record, the state post-conviction process may represent the only op-
portunity for an inmate to develop the claim and ensure proper
review. However, the state criminal appellate process often curtails
the inmate’s factual development of claims with little or no justifica-
tion.75 Further exacerbating the problem are the legislative and
judicial efforts to confine most of the substantive review of constitu-
tional claims to the state courts.76 As the Supreme Court becomes
more deferential to state direct and collateral proceedings, it is of
paramount importance to ensure those proceedings permit the full
development of evidence necessary to support constitutional
claims.77
70. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that direct appeal counsel
must be effective under the Sixth Amendment); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991) (holding there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction).
71. Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 973 (2012)
(describing the difficulties pro se inmates have in properly litigating their claims in state post-
conviction in order to avail themselves of substantive review in federal habeas corpus).
72. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (allowing procedural bar to federal habeas
corpus if an inmate bypasses state post-conviction process); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977); see also Marceau, supra note 6, at 147–48.
73. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013).
74. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims may
meet the cause and prejudice standard for defeating a procedural default where a counsel’s
ineffectiveness precludes proper claim development in the initial collateral review). Justice
Kennedy also emphasized that, for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the like,
state court is the proper venue for full investigation, litigation, and substantive review to
evaluate whether any rights were violated.
75. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
76. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(8) (1966), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2)
(1996); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636 (1993); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 730–32 (1991); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398–99 (2011).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) & (d)(2); see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784; Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. at 1398–99.
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Since state collateral proceedings are the first and, in many cases,
the only opportunity a defendant may have for a complete review of
constitutional claims, a defendant’s margin of error in the develop-
ment and litigation of these cases is slim.78 However, the level of
substantive review provided by state courts in collateral proceedings
can be minimal.79 Moreover, a defendant who fails to present all his
factual support for every constitutional violation at the first availa-
ble opportunity may even further curtail his substantive review in
state court, and will feel the sting of extreme deference to state
court determinations in federal habeas corpus proceedings.80
This places a significant burden on an incarcerated defendant to
conduct a full investigation into both the records and witnesses nec-
essary to substantiate a constitutional claim.81 Even in states where
post-conviction counsel is provided, there are little to no investiga-
tive resources or funds for experts or forensic testing to develop the
merits of a claim.82 Yet, failure to properly raise a claim consisting
of both the legal basis and all relevant facts and supporting docu-
mentation results in either (1) a state court review on the merits
despite the incomplete record, which then mandates deferential re-
view by the federal court,83 or (2) a procedural bar that prevents
substantive review in federal habeas.84
D. Brady Claims in Federal Habeas Corpus: Cause and Prejudice
A state court finding of procedural default often precludes any
federal substantive review. The Supreme Court has emphasized to
defendants the importance of complying with state procedural
rules during trial, during direct appeal, and throughout collateral
proceedings. It has done so by repeatedly upholding the state pro-
cedural bars that prevent federal review.85 Procedural bars can
78. See Wiseman, supra note 71, at 972.
79. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (holding that state courts are not required to draft full
opinions stating their reasons for their holdings for 2254(d) deference standard to apply in
federal habeas).
80. Id.
81. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012); see also Hash v. Johnson, 845 F.
Supp. 2d 711, 741 (W.D. Va. 2012) (explaining defendant’s need to conduct an independent
investigation separate from the police investigation).
82. Wiseman, supra note 71, at 973 (discussing the difficulties state post-conviction liti-
gants face in building a proper record for review in federal habeas corpus when state courts
refuse to provide necessary resources like experts, investigation funding, or discovery).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
84. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
85. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1986); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977).
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result from a defendant’s failure to object at trial, to properly liti-
gate every potential claim at the first available opportunity, or even
to sign an acknowledgment. Any deviation may prevent the state
court from reviewing a potentially meritorious claim,86 which may
also preclude federal courts from conducting a comprehensive
review.87
Procedural bar rules allow state courts to have the first crack at
fixing any problems with their convictions: “In the context of fed-
eral habeas proceedings, the independent and adequate state
ground doctrine is designed to ‘ensur[e] that the States’ interests
in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas
cases.’”88 Similar to the exhaustion requirement,89 the purpose of
federal courts’ deference to state courts is to provide the latter the
first opportunity to conduct a full review of a defendant’s claims
both on their factual and constitutional bases.90
Provided a state procedural bar passes constitutional muster, a
defendant who has failed to comply with state procedural rules may
still be able to preserve his constitutional claim if he can prove
“cause and prejudice” in violating the state rule.91 A showing of
cause and prejudice requires an explanation as to why the constitu-
tional claim could not be properly raised in accordance with state
procedural law and how dismissing the constitutional claim hurts
the defendant.92 The defendant satisfies the “cause” prong by show-
ing “that some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”93 In
86. See Justin Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas
Corpus Adjudication, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 33–34 (2010) [hereinafter Marceau, Don’t Forget Due
Process].
87. Such prohibitions will only be given effect, however, if the bar (1) gives adequate
notice to defendants that noncompliance will disallow review and (2) is independent of any
federal law or constitutional provision. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81 (stating that only those
procedural bars complying with both requirements will be honored in federal court). Fur-
thermore, if a state court deviates in its handling of a state procedural rule, federal courts are
not obliged to honor that bar in federal habeas corpus review. Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 729–31 (1991).
88. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732); see also
Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process, supra note 86, at 12 (explaining the Supreme Court’s re-
quirement of a state collateral process to satisfy due process “full and fair” review).
89. See infra note 160.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2006); see also Marceau, supra note 6, at 113–15
(explaining that even with clear prosecutorial misconduct claims, federal courts under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) must give deference to state court
holdings). But see Wiseman, supra note 71, at 954–56 (explaining the complications of the
Pinholster decision on deference to state court decisions with the lack of proper ability to
build a complete record).
91. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479 (1986).
92. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 478.
93. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488.
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other words, the defendant must show that either the courts or the
state have infringed on his ability to properly abide by state proce-
dural rules.94 Brady claims, by their nature, fit this criterion, since it
is state malfeasance that causes Brady violations. 95 Prejudice, on the
other hand, is met when a defendant shows the actual harm suf-
fered from courts not substantively reviewing his constitutional
claim concerning withheld evidence. The defendant must present
specific evidence in the form of witness statements, further forensic
testing, or other documentation explaining how the withheld evi-
dence unconstitutionally harmed the defendant’s case.96
Therefore, if they are able to show prejudice, defendants with
viable Brady claims that have been procedurally barred by state
courts may still obtain substantive review in federal courts. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has recognized the parallel elements of Brady
claims and the cause and prejudice standard,97 so a defendant with
a meritorious Brady claim satisfies the cause and prejudice standard,
allowing federal courts to reach the merits of the constitutional vio-
lation and grant a writ of habeas corpus.  The Court’s rationale for
waiving the procedural bar on a Brady claim is the state prosecutor’s
failure to comply with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process re-
quirements. Because the federal courts recognize that these
violations often continue through state post-conviction, they permit
a potentially underdeveloped, procedurally barred claim to have a
full merits review in federal habeas corpus. The state’s failure to
provide evidence favorable to the defendant at trial may therefore
also excuse the defendant’s state post-conviction counsel’s failure
to raise a claim properly in state collateral proceedings:
If it was reasonable for trial counsel to rely on, not just the
presumption that the prosecutor would fully perform his duty
to disclose all exculpatory materials, but also the implicit rep-
resentation that such materials would be included in the open
files tendered to defense counsel for their examination, we
94. Id. But see Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (allowing ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to investigate to satisfy the cause and prejudice standard in certain situa-
tions); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012). Both Martinez and Trevino are narrow
exceptions to the Court’s holding in Coleman v. Thompson that a defendant’s own actions, or
those of his attorney, cannot satisfy the “cause” prong.
95. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).
96. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–90; Carrier,
477 U.S. at 493–94.
97. Banks, 540 U.S. at 691; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 582.
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think such reliance by counsel appointed to represent peti-
tioner in state habeas proceedings was equally reasonable.98
The prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice standard is satis-
fied by the same showing as the materiality element of a Brady
claim. The synonymous standards for materiality and prejudice re-
quire a defendant to articulate the harm suffered from the state’s
improper action.99 In Strickler v. Greene, the Supreme Court ex-
plained how a viable Brady claim aligns with the long-standing
requirements of cause and prejudice.100 The Court understood
that, when the State withholds relevant records, it has a significant
ripple effect on the ability of the defendant to properly raise and
fully litigate claims in both state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus. Therefore, this reprieve from state procedural bars is neces-
sary to restore fairness to the criminal process. Once an inmate
satisfies all elements of Brady in federal habeas, the court will ex-
cuse any procedural bars imposed by the state courts on the claim.
This allows the federal court to grant relief despite the procedural
defects.
Although the defendant’s Brady claim was unsuccessful in
Strickler, the pathway was cleared for other defendants with meritori-
ous claims to obtain relief.101 For instance, in Banks v. Dretke, the
Supreme Court found that Banks satisfied the “cause and
prejudice” standard, thereby allowing him to bypass the procedural
defaults that would otherwise have been imposed on him for failing
to fully litigate his claim in state court.102
Banks was convicted for murdering Richard Whitehead and sen-
tenced to death. Based on the prosecution’s assertion of open-file
98. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 284 (explaining that materiality satisfies prejudice, which allows
for a substantive review of the claim).
99. This was addressed in Banks:
“[C]ause and prejudice” in this case “parallel two of the three components of the
alleged Brady violation itself.” Corresponding to the second Brady component (evi-
dence suppressed by the State), a petitioner shows “cause” when the reason for his
failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State’s suppression of the
relevant evidence; coincident with the third Brady component (prejudice), prejudice
within the context of the “cause and prejudice” exists when the suppressed evidence is
“material” for Brady purposes.
Banks, 540 U.S. at 691 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282) (internal citation omitted).
100. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282–83.
101. See Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 384–86 (3rd Cir. 2004); see also Ward v. Hall,
592 F.3d 1144, 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 2010); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1327 (11th Cir.
2002) (applying the “cause and prejudice” standard to procedurally defaulted claims but
ultimately denying the petitions for habeas).
102. Banks, 540 U.S. at 700–03.
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discovery, the defense did not file any discovery motions.103 The
State’s case against Banks rested largely on the testimony of two
witnesses: Charles Cook and Robert Farr. Cook, a confidential in-
formant, told Deputy Sheriff Willie Huff of Banks’s meeting with
the victim, which led police to a gun that was later determined to be
the murder weapon.104 Farr corroborated Cook’s explanation about
the murder weapon to police. When asked if he ever received
money or benefits for his testimony, Farr denied any deals.105 De-
fense counsel’s request for documents relating to the confidential
informant were denied on the theory that the information was, ac-
cording to the police department, privileged.106 Both men received
benefits; Farr received payments for his testimony, and Cook was
not prosecuted after his testimony against Banks.107
After his first two state post-conviction appeals were denied,
Banks filed a third appeal alleging, for the first time, that Farr was a
police informant, that Cook received a “generous deal” from the
prosecution, and that the concealment of this information violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights.108 The prosecution repeatedly
argued that all claims be denied on the assertion that “nothing was
kept secret from the defense.”109 Supporting the prosecution’s ar-
gument were affidavits from Deputy Sheriff Huff and the trial
prosecutors, which refuted Banks’s allegations.110 The state post-
conviction court denied relief on the basis that there was no hidden
deal with Cook but made no comment on allegations regarding
Farr.111
In Banks’s federal habeas corpus petition, he again raised similar
claims of Brady violations. The magistrate judge granted limited dis-
covery in regards to Cook as well as an evidentiary hearing to prove
the merits of Banks’s constitutional claims. Banks renewed his re-
quest for full discovery based upon affidavits from both Cook and
Farr regarding their deals with the prosecution at trial.112 Specifi-
cally, both men explained:
Farr had “set Delma up” by proposing the drive to Dallas and
informing Deputy Sheriff Huff of the trip. Accounting for his
103. Id. at 677, 692.
104. Id. at 676.
105. Id. at 678.
106. Id. at 676–77.
107. Id. at 685.
108. Id. at 682–83.
109. Id. at 683.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 684.
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unavailability earlier, Farr stated that less than a year after the
Banks trial, he had left Texarkana, first for Oklahoma, then
for California, because his police-informant work endangered
his life. Cook recalled that in preparation for his Banks trial
testimony, he had participated in “three or four . . . practice
sessions” at which prosecutors told him to testify “as they
wanted [him] to, and that [he] would spend the rest of [his]
life in prison if [he] did not.”113
Based upon this newly discovered evidence showing substantial
police and prosecutorial misconduct, the magistrate ordered full
disclosure by the Bowie County District Attorney.114 The disclosed
files included transcripts of Cook’s interrogation, which showed the
great lengths the prosecution went through to rehearse Cook’s tes-
timony shortly before trial.115 Further, Deputy Sheriff Huff
admitted for the first time at the evidentiary hearing that Farr was
paid 200 dollars pretrial after the State denied the point in prior
state trial and appellate proceedings.116
The Supreme Court found that Banks established cause and
prejudice through his Brady claim concerning Farr. Specifically,
with regard to the cause prong, the Court focused on the deceptive
nature of the prosecution’s actions through the pretrial, trial, and
post-conviction phases of litigation.117 The Court explained that a
defendant is not required to keep hunting for relevant records or
interviews when the State offers open discovery or explains that
such evidence does not exist.118 The Court dismissed the State’s ap-
proach that the lack of disclosures in state collateral proceedings
prevents the grant of relief when the prosecution improperly with-
holds evidence:119 “Banks had little to proffer in support of a
request for assistance from the state post-conviction court. We as-
sign no overriding significance to Banks’s failure to invoke state-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 685.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 696–98.
118. Id. at 698. “In summary, Banks’s prosecutors represented at trial and in state post-
conviction proceedings that the State had held nothing back. Moreover, in state
postconviction court, the State’s pleading denied that Farr was an informant. It was not in-
cumbent on Banks to prove these representations false; rather, Banks was entitled to treat the
prosecutors’ submissions as truthful. Accordingly, Banks has shown cause for failing to pre-
sent evidence in state court capable of substantiating his Farr Brady claim.” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
119. Id. at 696–97 (describing the State’s argument that the defendant must avail himself
of state post-conviction discovery to find potential Brady evidence and that the failure to do
so should negate the “cause” prong for avoiding procedural default).
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court assistance to which he had no clear entitlement.”120 Further-
more, the Court found that the prejudice prong was satisfied based
on the weight the prosecution put on Farr’s testimony in both the
guilt and penalty phases of Banks’s trial.121
The Court’s benchmark holdings in both Strickler and Banks shed
light on a fundamental reality of how Brady materials are uncovered
in the criminal appeals process. Often, the state post-conviction
process provides very little, if any, means to request or obtain files
from law enforcement or prosecuting agencies.122 Even when de-
fense attorneys find alternate means to locate vital evidence, such as
open records laws, the disclosures may come well after post-convic-
tion statutes of limitation have passed or an initial post-conviction
petition has been filed.123 Consequently, the evidence is often
unexhausted through state courts.124 Therefore, submission of
these materials in a successor state collateral action will result in
procedural bars, which then prevent meaningful federal review.
The cause and prejudice standard serves as the only means whereby
meritorious Brady claims can receive substantive review in federal
habeas corpus when procedural bars would otherwise deny such re-
view. Excusing procedural defects in these claims on account of the
state’s misconduct gives the defendant a forum, and the federal
courts the opportunity, to rectify the constitutional violation.
However, while the cause and prejudice standard gives Brady
claims a way to avoid some procedural pitfalls, such claims are not
immune from other procedural requirements. For instance, ex-
haustion prevents federal courts from adjudicating claims when the
legal bases and underlying facts of the claim have not been “fairly
presented” through the state appellate or collateral procedures.125
120. Id. at 697.
121. Id. at 702–03.
122. See, e.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the state’s
post-conviction ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of existing Supreme
Court precedent because Milke repeatedly requested impeachment evidence, which was de-
nied by the state post-conviction court).
123. Many state post-conviction laws require an application or state habeas petition to be
filed no later than one year after the direct appeal is finalized. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.73.090 (2012) (providing one year). Further, many states have much shorter time peri-
ods, making compliance difficult given the open records timing. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1415(a) (2012) (requiring a capital defendant to file a motion for post-conviction relief
within 120 days).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring a prisoner to exhaust “the remedies
available in the courts of the State”); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (discussing
the exhaustion requirement in light of the fact that many prisoners tend to submit mixed
federal habeas petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims).
125. Rose, 455 U.S. at 523; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82–83 (1977).
716 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:3
Existing or new constitutional claims supported by evidence uncov-
ered after state post-conviction proceedings must be presented to
the state courts before a federal court may substantively review
them.126 This includes Brady violations where the state appellate
process appears to provide a means for substantive review.
The Court’s recent decision in Cullen v. Pinholster may take the
exhaustion principle further and deny state prisoners the opportu-
nity to have their claims decided on the merits.127 As discussed later,
federal courts, may be prohibited from ever considering evidence
that was not before the state court during collateral proceedings,
even when the state collateral process provided no mechanism to
find such evidence.
II. HOW BRADY CLAIMS ARE USUALLY UNCOVERED IN
POST-CONVICTION
Brady materials are often discovered fortuitously during the page-
by-page review of police reports, reading a district attorney’s files
disclosed through post-conviction discovery, or through an open
records request.128 The relevant information can be uncovered
through something as random as a prosecutor’s notation about an
undisclosed plea deal or forensic testing results that show the de-
fendant’s samples do not match the crime scene samples.129 This is
evidence which, had it been disclosed, would have provided ample
material for impeachment or exculpatory testimony. However, it is
difficult to locate these materials in the relevant state or federal
agencies.
Part of the difficulty for a defendant in finding such evidence
after a direct appeal is the lack of a continuing obligation on the
part of the prosecution to disclose Brady material. Prior to convic-
tion, a prosecutor is obligated to locate and disclose any
impeachment or exculpatory evidence held by any state or federal
126. Rhine v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 646–47
(2005).
127. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 671–72 (1985) (describing how re-
spondent uncovered Brady materials uncovered from Freedom of Information Act and
Privacy Act requests); Slutzker v. Johnson, 343 F.3d 373, 377–79 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing
how petitioner subpoenaed the police department post-conviction and received twenty-one
previously undisclosed police reports related to the murder investigation); White v. Helling,
194 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 1999) (describing how petitioner uncovered six new exhibits in
discovery during habeas proceedings).
129. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 84–89, 127–30.
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agency that participated in the investigation or evaluation of evi-
dence.130 However, once a defendant is convicted, this duty
evaporates.131 While almost every state’s ethical rules contain a con-
tinuing obligation to disclose evidence that may show innocence,132
there is little to no legal precedent mandating such a duty, and
state bar associations are reluctant to hold errant prosecutors lia-
ble.133 Therefore, any impetus to locate evidence that substantiates
a misconduct claim falls to the defendant. This burden would not
be problematic if state systems provided mechanisms to locate,
plead, and litigate these misconduct claims. However, without a sys-
tem in place to find and review files from law enforcement and the
prosecution, defendants are hamstrung in their ability to meet state
and federal procedural requirements for presenting both the legal
basis and all relevant factual support for their constitutional claims.
There are two methods a defendant can pursue to locate records
that may be used for constitutional claims in a state collateral pro-
ceeding: post-conviction discovery provisions and open records
acts. Defendants will often avail themselves of both strategies, given
the current limitations of each system. A defendant’s ability to suc-
cessfully obtain records under either method depends on the
openness of the state system. States provide different levels of access
to records.  The key for any defendant to successfully navigate ei-
ther state post-conviction discovery or open records is a thorough
understanding of the limits of both systems and what information is
discoverable from each.
130. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (quoting the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) and the
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1984)).
131. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009)
(finding no continuing obligation to disclose evidence once a defendant is convicted).
132. See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 7–8, Smith
v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145). Model Rule 3.8(d) reflects the legal commu-
nity’s long-standing consensus, first expressed in the ABA’S CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (“ABA
1908 Canons”), that it would be “highly reprehensible” to allow prosecutors to withhold evi-
dence that might establish a defendant’s innocence. Id. at n. 13. Model Rule 3.8(d)’s
widespread acceptance is reflected in the fact that forty-nine states, as well as the District of
Columbia, the United States Virgin Islands, and Guam, have adopted ethics rules that in-
clude a provision identical or substantially similar to it. Id.
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8; see also 28 U.S.C. § 530B. Only a handful of
prosecutors are ever punished for violating Brady. But see Maurice Chammah, Anderson Ap-
peals, Citing Statute of Limitations, TEXAS TRIBUNE, April 23, 2013 (describing how a state court
judge issued an arrest warrant for the prosecutor who unconstitutionally withheld exculpa-
tory and impeachment evidence in the Michael Morton wrongful conviction case. Mr.
Morton was incarcerated for almost twenty-five years); CA: Bar Judge Recommends Jon Alexander
Be Disbarred, Would Be First District Attorney to Be Disbarred in History of California, THE OPEN FILE
(Apr. 8, 2013) (California bar judge recommended disbarment after finding the prosecutor
violated three rules of professional conduct, including the suppression of evidence).
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A. State Post-Conviction Discovery Provisions
States’ post-conviction systems differ as to the types of claims
which can be asserted, the statute of limitations for filing such
claims, and whether representation will be provided.134 Similarly,
there is a great deal of variance concerning discovery of records
and evidence relevant to the constitutional claims asserted. For ex-
ample, some states allow access only in certain types of cases, like
capital cases or post-conviction DNA testing challenges.135 Indiana
provides for post-conviction discovery on the same grounds as
would be available in civil actions.136 North Carolina mandates re-
ciprocal discovery during collateral proceedings.137 However,
twenty-four states lack any state or court rule whatsoever that would
allow defendants to pursue discovery during their state collateral
proceeding.138 These defendants are thus obligated to fully plead in
collateral proceedings the underlying factual basis for all constitu-
tional violations occurring during their pretrial and trial
proceedings, even though they lack the records necessary to meet
the elements of the claims.
The nine states with the broadest discovery statutes have provi-
sions that mirror the federal habeas corpus standard of “good
cause,” which allows the defendant access to records if he is able to
make out a prima facie case as to how the requested information
would help substantiate his constitutional claim.139 The defendant
must plead specific details with supporting evidence in the form of
134. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2012) (discussing which states allow post-
conviction counsel and which do not as well as when substantive claims can be raised in these
states); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914–16 (2013) (discussing the specific
requirements of the Texas system).
135. ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010(4) (1962); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-125 (2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-4902 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5564 (2009) (addressing DNA discovery
cases); OKLA. CT. R.P. 9.7 (addressing capital cases).
136. INDIANA R. POST-CONVICTION 1 § 5.
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415 (2007).
138. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming.
139. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b), 32.3, 32.4; LA. R. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 929 (clarified by
State ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley, 602 So. 2d 721 (La. 1992)); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-15 (1972);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.780 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-08 (2013); PA. R. CRIM. P. 902
(allowing discovery in capital cases or extraordinary circumstances in non-capital cases); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-27-150 (1976); UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(n); W. VA. POST-CONVICTION HABEAS
CORPUS R. 7.
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affidavits, records, etc. to satisfy the good cause standard.140 Simi-
larly, several other states place the burden on defendants to
articulate a concrete basis for believing that the police or prosecu-
tion withheld evidence that would put the case in a different
light.141
One of the primary difficulties in satisfying the good cause stan-
dard, especially when the defendant does not have access to
counsel, is providing enough evidence to justify the request for ad-
ditional discovery. This is easier with constitutional claims where
the need for further discovery is clear from the trial transcripts,
such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or faulty foren-
sics.142 In the Brady context, on the other hand, a defendant is often
arguing a theory: the state acted improperly during trial because a
witness recanted, or there appears to be some prior convictions not
disclosed, and there may be more evidence the prosecution failed
to divulge. Problems can arise in locating that information. For an
incarcerated defendant without counsel, it is almost impossible to get
the affidavits supporting the recantation or an expert opinion show-
ing faulty forensics. For example, Banks produced affidavits from
an ex-girlfriend and the declarations of Cook and Farr, which were
gathered by the capital defense team and not by Banks.143 Similarly,
Douglas and Powell had counsel assist in providing affidavits con-
cerning the prosecution’s withheld evidence.144
An obvious benefit of allowing discovery in state post-conviction
or collateral review is that it helps the courts to determine whether
140. See RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 PROCEEDINGS IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, Rule
6, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908–09 (1997).
141. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9 (2008); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61 (clarified by Dawson
v. State, 673 A.2d 1186 (Del. 1996)); ME. R. CRIM. P. 72; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(c)(4) (where
affidavits filed by the moving party under subdivision (c)(3) establish a prima facie case for
relief, the judge on motion of any party, after notice to the opposing party and an opportu-
nity to be heard, may authorize such discovery as is deemed appropriate, subject to
appropriate protective order); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01 (West 2010); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 46-21-201(4) (2011); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28, §§ 6(c)(7), 7; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
11.07 (West 2005 & Supp. 1A 2012); People v. Smith, 817 N.E.2d 982 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004);
Collison v. Underwood, 339 S.E.2d 897 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing depositions when fac-
tual dispute remains in habeas petition).
142. Under Brady and Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2245, it is of paramount
importance to be specific with the discovery request. Thus, the request should have factual
support in the form of affidavits, court records, expert reports, and similar documentary
support so as to determine whether the constitutional claim has merit or is frivolous. In the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel or faulty scientific evidence, there are often
records or expert reports accompanying such a discovery request providing clear support for
the discovery grant. However, Brady claims suffer due to the absence of adequate documen-
tary proof to meet the good cause standard. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
143. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 682–84 (2004).
144. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1163 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009).
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the suspected state materials substantiate misconduct claims or not.
Handling these claims at this juncture is what both the state and
federal courts hoped would be achieved with the changes in federal
habeas corpus jurisprudence.145 When the state system allows for
such discovery, these claims can be litigated and adjudicated with
full examination in state appellate or collateral proceedings. Fur-
ther, if police or prosecutorial misconduct occurred, it can be
rectified in a state forum as intended by the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). If a retrial should be necessary,
then it can happen with less delay and minimum prejudice to either
the state or defense. Such prompt action restores faith in the integ-
rity of the criminal justice system overall.
B. Utilizing Open Records Laws to Find Brady Materials
The other avenue for locating records in state and federal cus-
tody are open records acts. These acts allow citizens to request
various records from internal state agencies under the auspices of
governmental transparency. Each state’s open records law differs
with respect to what a person may request and which files are open
for or exempted from review.146 Additionally, each law specifies
copy fees and other administrative requirements.147 Some states
prohibit requests from anyone who is not a resident of the state
where the records are requested.148
The defendant who is pursuing an open records request must
first get a clear understanding of what records are designated as
open. Knowing whether records are opened or closed can be the
difference between whether the records are obtained or not, as an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that some state agency employees lack a
clear understanding of their state’s statutes.149 Therefore, it is im-
perative that the defendant knows what he can obtain when seeking
records because the defendant may have to explain to an agency’s
records custodian what the law deems an open record.150 There
145. See supra notes 75–76 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on deferring
to state court decisions in federal habeas corpus review).
146. See THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A REPORTER’S STATE-BY-STATE
ACCESS GUIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS (2008).
147. See generally FLA STAT. § 119.07(4)(A)1 (West 2007) (giving the default fees for Flor-
ida’s Sunshine Provision); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1307 (2009) (setting out Pennsylvania’s fee
schedule for open records).
148. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013) (finding that there is no constitu-
tional right to information provided by FOIA requests).
149. See REPORTERS COMM., supra note 146, at 4.
150. Id.
SPRING 2014] Futility of Exhaustion 721
may be dispute over which files are obtainable and which redac-
tions must be made; privacy concerns are balanced with the goals of
transparency.151
Even when state post-conviction rules provide for discovery, the
defendant may run up against closed law enforcement records,
which are exempt from records requests.152 How a state designates
each group is solely within the legislature’s province.153 The legisla-
ture also decides whether the police investigation is ongoing or
completed after the defendant has been convicted or acquitted,
which matters since a case must be completed for a defendant to
have access to the records. In some states, the police investigation
counts as completed for most purposes, and related records may be
accessible depending on the state’s aforementioned classifica-
tion.154 Other states classify police files as exempt or open only after
a certain level of criminal appeals has concluded.155 In other words,
some open records acts will allow requests for these records, while
others will not. Numerous states exempt all law enforcement
records from disclosure regardless of whether the case is open or
closed.156
151. From past experiences, obtaining public records under state open records laws var-
ies greatly based on the agency, knowledge of the staff, and persistence. See NAT’L FREEDOM
OF INFO. COAL., STATES FAILING FOI RESPONSIVENESS (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.
nfoic.org/states-failing-foi-responsiveness. “This national study shows that in the vast majority
of states, citizens have little to no recourse when faced with unlawful denial of access under
their state’s FOI laws,” said Charles N. Davis, executive director of the National Freedom of
Information Coalition, based at the University of Missouri School of Journalism. “It’s a cry for
reform of FOI laws nationwide.” Id.
152. See, e.g., infra note 156 and accompanying text.
153. See Brooke Barnett, Use of Public Record Databases in Newspaper and Television New-
srooms, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 557, 560 (2001) (discussing the change in open records law from
state legislatures); see also McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013) (holding that state
statute restricting access to FOIA records to state residents only is not a violation of the U.S.
Constitution).
154. See REPORTERS COMMITTEE, supra note 146, at 3.
155. See ALASKA STAT. § 40.25.120(a)(6)(A) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(4)
(2009); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-335(2) (2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.878(1)(h) (LexisNexis
2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(1) (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.82, subd. 7 (West
2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.100.2 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.7 (2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 315–20 (2010); State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994);
Martin v. Musteen, 799 S.W.2d 540 (Ark. 1990); State v. Kokal, 562 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1990).
156. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(d)(i)–(vii) (2012); IOWA CODE §§ 22.75(5), 321.271
(2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-29-1 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-101 to 515 (2010); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-3506, 29-3520 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1(D) (Lexis-
Nexis 2003); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 51 § 24A.8.B (2012); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1307 (2009); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(4)(i)(D) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-10 (2013); TENN. R. CRIM. P.
16; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.108 (West 2005); see also Williams v. Superior Court, 852
P.2d 377 (Cal. 1993).
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For those states that classify law enforcement records as open,
either because the law enforcement records have passed the investi-
gative phase or the agency has the discretion to disclose, timing is
still an issue.157 Although a state may require the state agency to
respond to the request within a given timeframe, delivery of those
records is a different story. It may take months to obtain records
even if the agency fully complies with the request without any objec-
tion.158 This is true even among states with strict statutes of
limitation for their post-conviction systems.159 The timing places de-
fendants in a bind because newly discovered evidence (i.e. the
undisclosed records) must be presented to the state court in order
to exhaust the constitutional claim and the factual basis of the
claim. If a defendant files a state collateral motion inside the statute
of limitations, but finds his records after the lower state court has
decided the claim adversely, then he will be procedurally barred for
failing to observe the state court rules. If a defendant raises the evi-
dence in federal court, he will likely satisfy the cause and prejudice
standard, thereby defeating the procedural bar and allowing the
federal court to review the claim on the merits. However, the in-
mate will still be required to return to state court to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement under federal habeas rules.160
157. Most state discovery rules require that the case be deemed closed, i.e. successful
conviction, end of appeals, etc. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 40.25.120(a)(6)(A) (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 29-19-105(b)(6) (2011). But see Hengel v. City of Pine Bluff, 821 S.W.2d 761
(Ark. 1991); Fla. Stat. § 119.07(3)(f) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(4) (2009);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-335(2) (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.878(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2004);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(1) (2007); Fioretti v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 716 A.2d 258 (Md.
1998); Evening News Ass’n v. City of Troy, 339 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.82, subd. 7 (West 2013); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 610.100.1(3), 610.100.2 (1999); Lodge v.
Knowlton, 391 A.2d 893 (N.H. 1978); N.D. Cent. Code § 44-04-18.7 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, §§ 315–20 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1722(A) (2012); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580
P.2d 246 (Wash. 1978); Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 646 N.W.2d 811 (Wis. 2002).
The release of records in some states is based on discretion/good cause. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-72-305(5) (1982); Prestash v. City of Leadville, 715 P.2d 1272 (Colo. App.
1986); D.C. CODE § 5-113.06 (LexisNexis 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4(b)(1) (West
2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221(a)(10) (2000); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 2929 (2012); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203(b) (2013); Bd. of Managers of Del. Justice Info. Sys. v. Gannett Co.,
808 A.2d 453 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002); Donrey of Nev., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 798 P.2d 144 (Nev.
1990); Newberry Pub. Co., Inc., v. Newberry Cnty. Comm’n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 417
S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1992).
158. The FOIA timeline for response is twenty days with another ten days under special
circumstances. However, this does not mean the requestor will receive the records within that
timeframe if exemptions must be applied. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (2006). States usually
must respond within a reasonable amount of time, but such amount of time varies state-to-
state. See generally REPORTERS COMMITTEE, supra note 146.
159. See supra note 142.
160. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690–91 (2004) (indicating that exhaustion is still
required even though other procedural hurdles are met).
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III. WHY BRADY VIOLATIONS SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM
EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS
The goal of exhaustion is comity between the states and the fed-
eral government by allowing the states the first opportunity to
correct any potential constitutional or legal errors that may occur
within their jurisdiction before the federal courts intervene.161 How-
ever, giving state courts the first opportunity to address fully
substantiated Brady claims only serves the interests of comity when
state courts conduct a substantive review. Unfortunately, in most
cases, inmates are procedurally barred upon returning to state
court, making the entire process simply a source of unnecessary
delays.
A better alternative is to allow petitioners with Brady claims to
bypass the exhaustion requirement under the futility doctrine. The
federal habeas futility doctrine allows the state prisoner the oppor-
tunity to argue that review in state court will not be substantive in
nature. Under AEDPA, if the prisoner makes this argument success-
fully, he may bypass the exhaustion requirement altogether.162
Because most state reviews in Brady violations are not substantive in
nature, the state inmate who has been diligent in pursuing evi-
dence to substantiate his claim should be permitted to bypass
exhaustion through the futility doctrine.
Unfortunately, the futility doctrine has been narrowly applied. It
is given effect mostly in circumstances where there is no state post-
conviction avenue to pursue successor claims. In other words, when
the state’s post-conviction law seems to provide a means for mean-
ingful review, the federal courts require the state inmate to use that
process even though these successor claims will be considered pro-
cedurally barred. In both Tennison and Douglas, the states had a
legal mechanism for their newly discovered Brady evidence,163 but
neither defendant received any substantive review in state court. In
both cases, the state post-conviction courts denied their claims on
161. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277, 278 (1971) (noting exhaustion requires that
“the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to the state courts”
and that the substance may be the same “despite variations in the legal theory or factual
allegations” urged in support of the claim); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982);
Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
162. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(B).
163. See Tennison v. Henry, 203 F.R.D. 435 (2001) (granting defendant’s motion for dis-
covery); Tennison v. Henry, No. 98-3842 CW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27886 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
26, 2003) (granting defendant’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying
motion for evidentiary hearing); Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1168–69 (10th Cir.
2009) See generally OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 9.7(G)(3).
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procedural grounds, never reaching the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct.164
The illusion of meritorious state review serves no purpose but to
keep inmates with meritorious claims incarcerated and delay justice
for years, during which time the case bounces back and forth be-
tween state and federal court.165 Such delay is unnecessary and
unjust when the federal courts have already recognized some viable
ground for the claim (through its discovery grant) and have often
recognized the ability to trump procedural bars through cause and
prejudice. The existing futility doctrine permits state prisoners to
explain why exhaustion should be waived.166 Brady claims fitting
within this factual context therefore should be given the same
treatment.
Additionally, federal courts should be allowed to consider related
claims flowing from the concealed Brady evidence. For instance, if
the evidence shows that the prosecution failed to correct false evi-
dence before the trier of fact,167 or took some other action that
broadened the scope of the originally litigated Brady claim, then
any claim on such misconduct is likely unexhausted.168 Current
habeas corpus jurisprudence only allows claims to proceed with
new facts if those new facts do not “fundamentally alter the legal
claim already considered by the state court.”169 When the factual
predicate of a constitutional claim dramatically changes or spawns a
new claim, each circumstance requires exhaustion.170 Permitting
federal courts the ability to perform substantive review of any re-
lated claims, once cause and prejudice is satisfied on the original
Brady claim, permits the federal court to evaluate the case without
unnecessary delays. Such action coincides with the goals of judicial
economy and vindicates the state prisoner’s constitutional rights in
a more expedient manner.
164. Tennison, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27886, at *139–40; Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d
1156, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009).
165. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that any state court review that is
not “full and fair” is entitled to a complete review of federal habeas proceedings); see also
Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process, supra note 86, at 51 (explaining that a state collateral pro-
cess is not “full and fair” when it fails to provide inmates with the ability to properly develop
and litigate their claims as required when they seek review in federal habeas corpus
proceedings).
166. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(B); see also Woodform v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93
(2006) (explaining that lack of state review process may mean claims are exhausted).
167. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
168. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986) (stating that a claim keeps its ex-
hausted status so long as the newly developed facts do not fundamentally alter the claim
reviewed by the state courts).
169. Id.
170. Id.
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A. Cullen v. Pinholster and the Brady Problem
An additional complication for defendants with viable Brady
claims occurs when the state court has made a determination on
the merits either on direct appeal or in state collateral proceedings.
An “on the merits” determination in state court triggers the defer-
ence standard in federal habeas corpus.171 The Supreme Court’s
opinion in Cullen v. Pinholster changed the scope of the evidence a
federal court may consider in determining whether a state court’s
adjudication was unreasonable. Prior to Pinholster, a petitioner who
diligently sought to develop the factual basis for his constitutional
claims was able to obtain discovery during federal habeas litigation
while also presenting the factual evidence in a federal evidentiary
hearing.172 A federal court could evaluate a petitioner’s diligence
throughout state collateral proceedings and determine whether ad-
ditional evidence obtained after those proceedings substantiated
the claims.173 The petitioner may still need to exhaust his claims,
provided that the evidence either establishes a new claim or sub-
stantially changes the scope of an existing claim. 174 However, after
Pinholster, a defendant in this same situation may suffer additional
hurdles preventing relief.
Pinholster restricted a federal habeas court’s scope of review when
reviewing a state court decision that had been made on the merits
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).175 After the Pinholster
decision, a federal court trying to determine whether it can grant
the writ of habeas corpus under the strictures of §  2254(d) may
consider only the evidence that the state court had before it at the
time of the state court’s decision.176 This means that if the state
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)–(2) (2006).
172. See Marceau, supra note 6, at 147.
173. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435–36 (2000) (discussing why a diligent peti-
tioner should not be penalized for not fully developing a constitutional claim).
174. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975); see also Joyner v. King, 786 F.2d 1317 (5th
Cir. 1986).
175. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
176. Specifically, the federal court must make the determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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court reviewed a Brady claim on the merits, a federal court is lim-
ited to the record that the state court relied upon at the time of its
decision. Limiting a federal court’s evaluation to the state court re-
cord ensures that evidence garnered after the state proceedings will
never be considered in determining whether the state court’s rul-
ing was unreasonable or contrary to existing Supreme Court
precedent.177 This strict interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
makes it almost impossible for a petitioner, often proceeding pro
se, to properly assert his claims within the confines of the procedu-
ral labyrinth of federal habeas corpus and to explain why the merits
review of the state court is unreasonable in light of Brady. Further-
more, a state court no longer needs to articulate the basis for its
ruling before § (d)(1) applies.178
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Pinholster focuses on the key
problems with the majority’s opinion regarding the exclusion of ev-
idence beyond the state court record. First, the Court’s ruling
conflicts with the allowance of additional evidence permitted at an
evidentiary hearing.179 Under § 2254(e)(2), petitioners with addi-
tional factual evidence supporting their claims may present this
evidence during a federal evidentiary hearing.180 Once presented,
the court could assess whether the petitioner satisfied § 2254(d)(1).
177. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400.
178. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783–85 (2011) (holding a state court’s
summary disposition results in a § 2254(d)(1) review in federal habeas corpus, and it is in-
cumbent on a petitioner to articulate otherwise).
179. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Habeas precedent permits petitioners who have been
diligent to present evidence at a federal evidentiary hearing that they were unable to fully
develop in state court.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) provides:
(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a per-
son in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant
shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless
the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
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However, the Court’s holding potentially makes § 2254(e)(2) irrel-
evant, as any evidence obtained either through federal discovery or
presented at an evidentiary hearing is prohibited from being evalu-
ated since it is beyond the scope of the state court record.181 The
Court’s sudden shift thus strips out one of the main fact-finding
avenues consistently available in federal habeas.182
Second, petitioners who are diligent in trying to develop their
claims in state court, but are prohibited from doing so through no
fault of their own, would still be prohibited from presenting any
additional evidence obtained after state collateral proceedings con-
cluded.183 Justice Sotomayor emphasized the harm to diligent
petitioners of the majority’s opinion:
As a result, the majority either has foreclosed habeas relief for
diligent petitioners who, through no fault of their own, were
unable to present exculpatory evidence to the state court that
adjudicated their claims or has created a new set of procedural
complexities for the lower courts to navigate to ensure the
availability of the Great Writ for diligent petitioners.184
In either case, petitioners pursing Brady violations may be unable to
fully substantiate their claims regardless of whether the exhaustion
requirement applies.
181. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct at 1419–20 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
182. See supra notes 140, 180.
183. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct at 1417–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting):
Under our precedent, if the petitioner had not presented his Brady claim to the state
court at all, his claim would be deemed defaulted and the petitioner could attempt to
show cause and prejudice to overcome the default. If, however, the new evidence
merely bolsters a Brady claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, it is
unclear how the petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief after today’s holding.
What may have been a reasonable decision on the state-court record may no longer be
reasonable in light of the new evidence. Because the state court adjudicated the peti-
tioner’s Brady claim on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) would still apply. Yet, under the
majority’s interpretation of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court is now prohibited from con-
sidering the new evidence in determining the reasonableness of the state-court
decision.
Id. at 1418 (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 1419.
728 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:3
B. Aftermath of Pinholster and Brady Complications
The reaction of the federal courts to Pinholster has been mixed,
especially in the Brady context. Justice Sotomayor’s hypothetical re-
garding diligent Brady petitioners has borne out in various
jurisdictions. Gonzalez v. Wong is a clear example of how both the
state court appellate process and discovery provisions can fail to
provide a full and fair review.185 Gonzales was convicted of first-de-
gree murder and sentenced to death for killing a police officer
during the execution of an arrest warrant. His attorneys argued that
he was unaware that the people he shot as they entered his home
were police. They were not in uniform, and he believed that drug
dealers were after him.186 Statements made by him immediately af-
ter the shooting were introduced supporting his argument that he
did not know the police were entering his home.187 The State’s key
witness, William Acker, a jailhouse informant, testified that Gonza-
les told him he knew it was the police who were at his door and that
he wanted to kill a cop.188 Acker’s testimony was the key piece of the
prosecution’s case in justifying a death sentence.189 Gonzales was
convicted of first-degree murder and later sentenced to death.190
Throughout Gonzales’s case, his counsel requested Brady materi-
als concerning the informant.191 The prosecution provided
evidence in pretrial proceedings, but no other evidence was dis-
closed during the state post-conviction litigation.192 In state
collateral proceedings, Gonzales’s argument centered on the fact
that the prosecution provided only part of Acker’s criminal history
and neglected to disclose several major felonies, as well as whether
Acker was an informant in any other cases.193 The state post-convic-
tion court allowed discovery.194 The prosecution appealed the
ruling to the California Supreme Court, which overturned the dis-
covery. The Court said that “we expect and assume that if the
185. Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 971 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting correct spelling of
Gonzales), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 155 (2012).
186. Id. at 973–74.
187. Id. at 974.
188. Id. at 973.
189. Id. at 975.
190. Id. at 971.
191. Id. at 977–78.
192. Id. at 976.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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People’s lawyers have such information in this or any other case,
they will disclose it promptly and fully.”195
After being denied in state court, Gonzales pursued relief in fed-
eral habeas based on Brady and various other constitutional
violations. The district court granted him additional discovery but
denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. The new records re-
vealed significant evidence regarding Acker’s mental state.196 They
established “that Acker had a severe personality disorder, was men-
tally unstable, possibly schizophrenic, and had repeatedly lied and
faked attempting suicide in order to obtain transfers to other facili-
ties.”197 The district court denied a renewed motion for an
evidentiary hearing and further found that Gonzales failed to meet
the materiality prong for a successful Brady violation.198
The Supreme Court decided Pinholster while Gonzales’s case was
proceeding in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.199 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s three-judge panel split on how Pinholster impacted Gonzales’s
claims. The majority found a potentially meritorious Brady claim
based upon the Acker mental health material but were bound by
the Supreme Court’s ruling, which restricted their ability to con-
sider the new information:
We cannot fault Gonzales for a lack of diligence with respect
to the withheld reports. Responsibility for the late appearance
of those documents lies with the state. Despite discovery re-
quests by Gonzales’s trial counsel and the inherent obligation
of the prosecutor to turn over exculpatory material, these re-
ports were withheld. Gonzales made further discovery requests
while pursuing postconviction relief in state court, but the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court granted the State’s request to set aside
the trial court’s order permitting the discovery. That court did
195. Id. at 976 (citation omitted). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9 (2008); In re Steele,
85 P.3d 444 (Cal. 2004):
Section 1054.9 provides that if the defendant shows that good faith efforts to obtain
the materials from trial counsel failed, the court should order the defendant be given
access to “discovery materials,” defined as “materials in the possession of the prosecu-
tion and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been
entitled at time of trial.” . . . Although permitting defendants to reobtain items they
once possessed but have lost is one purpose, perhaps even the main purpose, of the
statute, the statutory language is not so limited.
Id. at 450.
196. Gonzales, 667 F.3d at 976.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 976–77.
199. Id. at 978.
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so while expressing its expectation that prosecutors would vol-
untarily and promptly turn over any such evidence, but that
expectation was not fulfilled. For us simply to ignore the
materials that did not emerge until the federal habeas pro-
ceedings would be to reward the prosecutor for withholding
them.200
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to state court for exhaustion
in hopes of expanding the scope of the state court record, thereby
allowing for full federal habeas review of these records should the
state court not grant Gonzales relief.201
The concurring opinion took a much different approach in light
of Pinholster. It focused on the faults of the state court system and
the district attorney’s office’s failure to provide Gonzales with the
mechanisms necessary for a full and fair hearing as envisioned by
AEDPA. Pinholster’s majority opinion did not address the situation
raised by Brady-based claims when the state court obstructed the
development of the factual basis of the claim, but Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent did draw attention to this problem.202 She
noted that a defendant in such a situation is unable to comply with
the strict requirements of Pinholster. In the above example, as the
concurrence in in the Ninth Circuit stated, Gonzales found himself:
opposed on all fronts by the state, and rejected on all fronts by
the California Supreme Court. Unlike Pinholster, who could
have put the relevant evidence before the state court but failed
to do so, Gonzales tried every means possible for putting the
evidence before the state court, but was prevented from doing
so by the combined actions of the prosecutor and the state
Supreme Court.203
200. Id. at 979–80.
201. Id. at 980 (citing Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005) (providing for federal
habeas cases to be stayed and held in abeyance while a petitioner exhausts his unexhausted
claims)).
202. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct at 1416 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d
802 (9th Cir. 2011), the court noted:
Pinholster leaves open the question of how to distinguish between a claim that was
exhausted in state court and a claim that is transformed by new evidence into a differ-
ent and novel contention presented for the first time in federal court. The Court in
Pinholster also had no occasion to speak to the role that new evidence plays in federal
habeas proceedings on those rare occasions when an evidentiary hearing is proper.
Id. at 808; see also Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1007 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013).
203. Gonzalez, 667 F.3d at 999 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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This combination of factors should exempt Brady claims from the
requirements of being bound by the state court record when the
state court reviews such claims on the merits.
The ripple effect of the circumstances like those in Gonzales’s
case places defendants in a position of asking federal courts to im-
pose state procedural bars on their Brady claims in the hopes of
avoiding an “on the merits” review in state post-conviction. Since
Pinholster deference only applies when state courts have reviewed
Brady claims on the merits, defendants are now arguing that their
claims are procedurally barred whenever there is any plausible ar-
gument regarding the state court’s ruling.204 Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent warned of the possibility that defendants would attempt to
thwart the aims of AEDPA because of Pinholster’s effect on Brady
claims.205 Specifically, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the
Court’s approach would undermine the purpose of deference
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).206 Arguing that a state court did not
adjudicate the merits of a claim will be the only avenue available to
defendants if the Supreme Court finds that Brady claim reviews
must also be limited to their state court record.
The Court must acknowledge the difficulties facing pro se de-
fendants as they try to comply with AEDPA’s restrictions. While the
Supreme Court is broadening the scope of those claims that satisfy
cause and prejudice,207 the deference provision must also give way
to diligent defendants who satisfy all other procedural hurdles to
achieve substantive review. Expanding the futility doctrine to allow
defendants to bypass exhaustion in cases of cause and prejudice
would help solve the problem.
204. Quezada v. Scribner, No. CV 04-7532-RSWL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92909, *8–9 (9th
Cir. 2011).
205. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct at 1418–19 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (“The majority presumably means to suggest that the petitioner might be able to
obtain federal-court review of his new evidence if he can show cause and prejudice for his
failure to present the ‘new’ claim to a state court. In that scenario, however, the federal court
would review the purportedly ‘new’ claim de novo. The majority’s approach thus threatens to
replace deferential review of new evidence under § 2254(d)(1) with de novo  review of new
evidence in the form of ‘new’ claims. Because it is unlikely that Congress intended de novo
review—the result suggested by the majority’s opinion—it must have intended for district
courts to consider newly discovered evidence in conducting the § 2254(d)(1) analysis.”).
207. Supreme Court precedent now allows for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to
meet the “cause and prejudice” standard when either direct appeal or state post-conviction
counsel fail to properly investigate and litigate the claim at the first available opportunity. See
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012); Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1921
(2013).
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CONCLUSION
By their very nature, Brady claims distinguish themselves from
other constitutional claims based on their reliance on the prosecu-
tion to do its job in seeking justice rather than just a conviction.
Too often, prosecutors ignore their obligation, which results in in-
nocent defendants and those with viable defenses being deprived of
evidence known to the prosecutor and his agents. Although diligent
in seeking access to evidence and requesting disclosure, these de-
fendants’ claims are stonewalled by a system that often does not
provide adequate means to develop their constitutional claims.
When a defendant’s diligence in obtaining evidence to which he
was entitled is not in question, and both the state appellate process
and prosecution are at fault for the lack of timely compliance, he
should be given expedited review in federal courts.
Allowing federal courts to handle these claims fits within the cur-
rent confines of habeas jurisprudence. The futility doctrine already
provides a mechanism where those who cannot avail themselves of
a state process for various reasons may bypass the exhaustion re-
quirement. Diligent inmates with Brady claims deserve the same
treatment, regardless of whether the state process provides a mech-
anism for their successor claims. Moreover, when a merits review
occurs at the state level without the exculpatory or impeachment
evidence to which the state inmate was entitled, Pinholster’s restric-
tion of federal review to an incomplete state record punishes the
inmate for unjust conduct beyond his control. Allowing federal
courts to review these claims promptly and efficiently will prevent
the injustices shared by Tennison, Douglas, and Powell from hap-
pening to others who will otherwise languish behind bars without
access to evidence or the courts.
